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747 
CLOSING THE CONSTANT GARDEN: THE 
REGULATION AND RESPONSIBILITY OF U.S. 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES DOING 
RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS IN 
DEVELOPING NATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Lampang, Thailand, a U.S. army doctor observed transmission rates 
between HIV-infected mothers and their infants without providing readily 
accessible medication that would likely have prevented the HIV 
transmission.1 In Buenos Aires, Argentina, a man being treated for 
unstable angina died after being given an experimental medication 
provided by a U.S.-based pharmaceutical company.2 It was later 
discovered that his signature on the treatment consent form had been 
forged, that he did not have unstable angina, and that the doctor who 
enrolled him in the study received $2,700 for doing so.3 Meanwhile, in 
Tuotuo, China, an isolated, impoverished, community where villagers live 
in reed huts, Harvard researchers promised free medical care to 
residents—but only if they were willing to donate their blood for genetic 
research.4 Subsequently, it was alleged that even though the blood was 
collected, in addition to millions of dollars in grant money based on the 
blood collection, the medical care was never provided.5 In Parnu, Estonia, 
a young man who could not resist the opportunity for a free trip to 
Switzerland, including travel, housing and a large stipend, agreed to test a 
drug that he believed was a vitamin.6 Once in Switzerland, he and 177 
other Estonians were given consent forms that they could not read; 
 
 
 1. See Mary Pat Flaherty & Doug Struck, The Body Hunters; Perils of Placebos, Life by Luck of 
the Draw; In Third World Drug Tests, Some Subjects Go Untreated, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2000 at A1 
(discussing ethical issues in various research projects related to transmission, vaccination and 
treatment of HIV and AIDS performed in Thailand). 
 2. See Karen DeYoung & Deborah Nelson, The Body Hunters: Testing’s El Dorado; Latin 
America is Ripe for Trials, and Fraud; Frantic Pace Could Overwhelm Controls, WASH. POST, Dec. 
21, 2000, at A1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. John Pomfret & Deborah Nelson, The Body Hunters: Harvesting China’s Blood; An Isolated 
Region’s Genetic Mother Lode; Harvard-Led Study Mined DNA Riches; Some Say Donors’ Promises 
Were Broken, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2000, at A1.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Sharon LaFraniere, Mary Pat Flaherty & Joe Stevens, The Body Hunters: Failure of Consent; 
The Dilemma: Submit or Suffer; ‘Uninformed Consent’ Is Rising Ethic of the Drug Test Boom, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at A1.  
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moreover, they were never informed of the true nature of the clinical trials 
in which they were to participate.7 In 1996, Kano, Nigeria was ravished by 
an outbreak of meningitis.8 A team from a large U.S.-based 
pharmaceutical company was dispatched to provide medical care to the 
victims and to test an antibiotic on Nigerian children. The team left two 
weeks later, leaving in their wake eleven dead children and numerous 
others suffering from long-term complications.9 What is the responsibility 
of U.S. courts when the U.S. government or U.S.-based corporations 
engage in unethical medical research abroad? What responsibility does the 
U.S. legislature have in attempting to prevent unethical medical research? 
This Note addresses remedies currently available to victims of unethical 
international research and discusses recommendations for future changes 
in this area of law.10  
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A.  The Impact of Nuremberg 
The development of international law with respect to medical 
experimentation has its origins in the Nuremberg Trials.11 At Nuremberg, 
Nazi physicians and scientists who engaged in human medical 
experimentation were prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against 
 
 
 7. Id. It was also alleged that the clinic staff was incompetent, that patients were forced to draw 
their own blood, and that study results were contaminated because patients, many of whom had 
substance abuse problems, exchanged urine samples. Id. The Swiss research was performed by Van Tx 
Research, Ltd., a Swiss company that contracted to do research for some of the largest U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies. Id. 
 8. Joe Stephens, The Body Hunters: Exporting Human Experiments; Where Profits and Lives 
Hang in Balance; Finding an Abundance of Subjects and Lack of Oversight Abroad, Big Drug 
Companies Test Offshore to Speed Products to Market, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at A1.  
 9. Id. Two hundred children were enrolled in the study having, at most, signed consent forms 
that they were unable to read and without being told that they could receive standard medical 
treatments free of charge from other medical teams within the facility. Id. 
 10. For an overview of the scope of the problem of clinical trials in underdeveloped countries, 
see Marcia Angell, The Body Hunters, THE NEW YORK REVIEW, Oct. 6, 2005, at 23 (book review) 
(“Probably close to half of all clinical trials are now conducted in the third world, although there is no 
way to know for sure.”). Although ethical guidelines for clinical trials in the United States are beyond 
the scope of this Note, for a good discussion of U.S. pharmaceutical research, development and 
marketing of drugs, see Marcia Angell, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES, HOW THEY DECEIVE 
US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004). 
 11. For an extensive discussion of the Nuremburg Trials and the resulting Nuremburg Code, see 
THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 
(George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). “The Nuremberg Code set the general agenda for 
all future ethical and legal questions pertaining to the conduct of human experimentation.” Id. at 6. 
Furthermore, “all contemporary debate on human experimentation is grounded in Nuremberg.” Id. at 
3.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/22
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humanity.12 Out of these trials, the Nuremberg Code was developed to 
“formulate a universal natural law standard for human experimentation.”13 
The Nuremberg Code’s principles “set the framework for United States 
federal regulations as well as . . . international guidelines.”14  
B.  The Declaration of Helsinki 
After the atrocities of World War II, the World Medical Association 
(WMA) was formed.15 In 1949, the WMA adopted the Declaration of 
Geneva to serve as a pledge for physicians regarding their duty to their 
patients.16 In 1964, the WMA adopted the Declaration of Helsinki in order 
to specifically address ethical principles for research involving human 
subjects.17 
 
 
 12. See id. at 3.  
 13. Id. The Nuremberg Code provides, inter alia: (1) subjects of medical experimentation must 
provide voluntary, informed consent; (2) the experiment must yield socially useful results that would 
not have been obtainable by other means; (3) the experiment should be conducted to minimize risk to 
the subject; and (4) the experiment must be terminated if the researcher believes that it may cause 
harm to the subject. The Nuremberg Code, reprinted in TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, Vol. 2, 181–82 
(Government Printing Office 1949), available at http://www.pnl.gov/hs/documents/nuremberg_ 
code.pdf.  
 14. Micheal A. Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND 
THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 121, 139 (George J. Annas & 
Micheal A. Grodin eds., 1992).  
 15. See The World Medical Association, WMA History, Background and Preliminary 
Organization, http://www.wma.net/e/history/background.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). 
 16. The Declaration of Geneva was adopted at the 3rd General Assembly of the WMA and is 
also known as the International Code of Medical Ethics. See WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1948), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/c8.htm 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2005). In relevant part, the Declaration proclaims: “The health of my patient will 
be my first consideration . . . . I will not permit considerations of age, disease or disability, creed, 
ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political affiliation, race, sexual orientation, or social standing to 
intervene between my duty and my patient.” Id.  
 17. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE DECLARATION OF HELSINKI (1964), available at 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf. The Declaration of Helsinki is “a statement of ethical 
principles to provide guidance to physicians and other participants in medical research involving 
human subjects.” Id. art. A(1). The Declaration of Helsinki states that “[i]n medical research on human 
subjects, considerations related to the well-being of the human subjects should take precedence over 
the interests of science and society.” Id. art. A(5). Furthermore,  
[m]edical research is subject to ethical standards that promote respect for all human beings 
and protect their health and rights. Some research populations are vulnerable and need special 
protection. The particular needs of the economically and medically disadvantaged must be 
recognized. Special attention is also required for those who cannot give or refuse consent for 
themselves, for those who may be subject to giving consent under duress, for those who will 
not benefit personally from the research and for those for whom the research is combined 
with care.  
Id. art. A(8). Additionally, “[r]esearch investigators should be aware of the ethical, legal and 
regulatory requirements for research on human subjects in their own countries as well as applicable 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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C.  The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
The Council for International Organization of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS) publishes international human subjects ethical guidelines in 
collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO).18 These 
guidelines are based on principles established by the Nuremberg Code and 
the Declaration of Helsinki. CIOMS offers twenty-one guidelines for 
research on human subjects which broadly cover: (1) ethical review; (2) 
informed consent; (3) populations with limited resources; (4) choice of 
control method; (5) vulnerable groups; (6) women as research participants; 
(6) confidentiality; (7) compensation; (8) ethical and scientific review of 
research; and (9) the obligation to provide healthcare services.19 The 
CIOMS guidelines provide the most rigorous guidelines for international 
human subject research to date.20 
D.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The United Nations addressed the subject of human experimentation in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 
states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”21 The 
 
 
international requirements.” Id. art. A(9). Other relevant provisions include that: (1) only qualified 
persons should perform the research; (2) research should be proceeded by risk/benefit analysis; (3) 
research risks should be minimized and managed; (4) research should only be conducted if the 
importance of the research outweighs potential burdens to subjects; (5) research should only be 
conducted on populations that will benefit from it; (6) in most circumstances, subjects must give 
voluntary, informed consent; (7) publishers have ethical obligations as well as researchers; (8) 
experimental treatments should be tested against a control group of the best known, established 
medical treatment; (9) at the conclusion of the study, all participants should be given access to the best 
proven treatment; (10) refusal to participate in the study should not interfere with the medical care 
rendered; and (11) experimental treatments may be used on patients who have failed treatment under 
established methods if (a) the patient consents, (b) the treatment offers hope of being life-saving, and 
(c) where possible, the treatment is the subject of research. Id. arts. B–C.  
 18. COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF MEDICAL SCIENCES (CIOMS), 
INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 7 
(2002) [hereinafter CIOMS ETHICAL GUIDELINES]. 
 19. Id. at 523–82. 
 20. Finnuala Kelleher, The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for Protecting Human 
Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 74 (2004). 
 21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 20, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
opened for signature Dec. 20, 1966, available at http://documents.un.org/simple.asp (search “A/6316” 
in symbol field). See also The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at http://documents. 
un.org (select “welcome”, then select “simple search”, then type “A/810” in the “Symbol” field) (“No 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/22
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United Nations’ formulation of informed consent is significant because it 
equates un-consented medical experimentation to torture and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment.22 The ICCPR, however, has been 
criticized for its “weak implementation provisions”23 and has yet to be 
applied to any human subject experimentation cases.24 
E.  U.S. Law and Policy 
Within the United States, the federal government imposes regulations 
on pharmaceutical research vis-à-vis the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) pursuant to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1962 (FDCA).25 
The National Research Act of 1974 (NRA) governs human subjects 
research.26 The NRA established the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
(NCPHS).27 Although the FDCA and the NRA do not directly apply to 
 
 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); 
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5(2), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 146 (1978) 
(“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.”); 
see African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 5, Org. of African 
Unity Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59, 60 (1982), http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Banju1%20Charter.pdf (“Every individual shall have the 
right to respect of the dignity inherent in being a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. 
All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.”). 
 22. See Kevin M. King, A Proposal for the Effective International Regulation of Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 163, 173 (1998) (proposing ICCPR as the 
“best option for the creation of an enforceable legal regime governing human experimentation” despite 
acknowledging enforcement difficulties). See also Benjamin Mason Meier, International Protection of 
Persons Undergoing Medical Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513, 550 (2002) (“A treaty-based solution would offer the best hope of unifying 
disparate national legislation and solidifying weak international ethics codes.”). 
 23. M. Cheriff Bassiouni et al., An Appraisal of Human Experimentation in International Law 
and Practice: The Need for International Regulation of Human Experimentation, 72 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1597, 1657 (1981).  
 24. See also Meier, supra note 22, at 534. 
 25. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399. Pursuant to this Act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
promulgated specific guidelines for human subjects research, which are found in 21 C.F.R. part 50. 
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) promulgates regulations known as “The 
Common Rule” for protection of human subjects and establishment of Institutional Review Boards 
under 45 C.F.R. part 46. Furthermore, contracts sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) are subject to 48 C.F.R. § 752.7012, which adopts the Common Federal Policy 
for the Protection of Human Subjects. 
 26. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342. The National Research Act (NRA) was enacted in response 
to the Tuskegee syphilis experiments and sets forth guidelines for establishing IRBs to approve and 
monitor human subjects research. The application of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the 
NRA to research conducted in the U.S. is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 27. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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research conducted outside the United States, they have some indirect 
implications for international research. Research involving devices the 
FDA regulates must comply with both the FDA and Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) regulations, including Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) and informed consent procedures.28 Additionally, DHHS has 
issued regulations for the protection of human subjects in federally funded 
research. But, the human subjects protection policy of foreign countries 
where the research is conducted may replace DHHS policy if such 
protection is determined to be equal or greater than DHHS policy.29 
1.  The Belmont Report 
In 1979, the NCPHS published the Belmont Report, which established 
basic ethical guidelines for performing biomedical and behavioral 
research.30 The Belmont Report establishes three basic principles of 
ethical human subjects research: respect for persons,31 beneficence,32 and 
justice.33 Application of these research principles involves informed 
 
 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], available at 
http://medicine.wustl.edu/~hsc/ethics/belmontreport.pdf (“One of the charges to the Commission was 
to identify the basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral 
research involving human subjects, and to develop guidelines, which should be followed to assure that 
such research is conducted in accordance with those principles.”). Furthermore, the Belmont Report is 
“the outgrowth of an intensive four-day period of discussion that [was] held in February 1976 at the 
Smithsonian Institution’s Belmont Conference Center, supplemented by monthly deliberations of the 
Commission that were held over a period of nearly four years.” Id. 
 28. Food and Drug Administration, INFORMATION SHEETS: GUIDELINES FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW BOARDS AND CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, Appendix E, 97–98 (1998), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/default.htm. 
 29. 45 C.F.R. part 46 subpart A, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,003 (1991). Notably, the DHHS has enacted 
more rigorous protection regulations for pediatric research. See Additional Protections for Children 
Involved as Subjects in Research, 48 Fed. Reg. 9818 (1991). See also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OEI-01-00-00190, THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
CLINICAL TRIALS (2001) [hereinafter OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT] (discussing the limitations of the 
applicability of U.S. law and regulation to research done by U.S. companies and citizens in foreign 
jurisdictions). 
 30. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 27. It is important to note that “the Belmont Report does not 
make specific recommendations for administrative action by the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare. Rather, the Commission recommended that the Belmont Report be adopted in its entirety, as 
a statement of the Department’s policy.” Id.  
 31. Id. “Respect for persons incorporates at least two ethical convictions: first, that individuals 
should be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that persons with diminished autonomy are 
entitled to protection.” Id. According to the report, respect for persons entails consideration of a 
person’s “opinions and choices” as well as assuring that research be voluntary and informed. Id.  
 32. Id. “Two general rules have been formulated as complementary expressions of beneficent 
actions in this sense: (1) do not harm; and (2) maximize possible benefits, and minimize possible 
harms.” Id.  
 33. Id. “An injustice occurs, when some benefit to which a person is entitled is denied without 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/22
p 747 Wollensack book pages.doc 10/29/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] CLOSING THE CONSTANT GARDEN 753 
 
 
 
 
consent,34 assessment of risks and benefits,35 and selection of subjects,36 
respectively. 
2.  The National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
Following the publication of the Belmont Report, there was little 
change or development in U.S. policy regarding ethics or regulation of 
human subjects research. After several highly–publicized cases and the 
Washington Post’s publication of “The Body Hunters” series,37 there was 
renewed interest in human subjects biomedical research. In April 2001, the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission38 (NBAC) published a report 
 
 
good reason, or when some burden is unduly imposed.” Id. The Commission cites the Nazi medical 
experiments and the Tuskegee syphilis study as examples of injustice. Id. The principle of justice is 
embodied within the selection of subjects: 
[T]he selection of research subjects needs to be scrutinized in order to determine whether 
some classes . . . are being systematically selected, simply because of their easy availability, 
their compromised position, or their manipulability . . . . [J]ustice demands both that [publicly 
funded research] not provide advantages only to those who can afford them, and that such 
research not unduly involve persons from groups unlikely to be among the beneficiaries of 
subsequent application of the research. 
Id. 
 34. The principle of respect for persons is embodied in informed consent. Id. Informed consent 
entails: (1) the provision of information such that a reasonable person could adequately decide whether 
they wish to participate in the study; (2) comprehension of the information provided; and (3) 
voluntariness of consent when granted. Id.  
 35. The principle of beneficence is addressed through an assessment of risks and benefits. Id. 
“The assessment of risks and benefits requires a careful arrayal of relevant data, including, in some 
cases, alternative ways of obtaining the benefits sought in the research.” Id. Relevant factors for 
consideration in this analysis are: (1) the nature and scope of the risks and benefits and (2) the 
systematic assessment of risks and benefits. Id.  
 36. Selection of subjects implicates the principle of justice and contains two relevant inquiries: 
individual selection of subjects and social selection of subjects. Id. “Individual justice in the selection 
of subjects would require that the researcher exhibit fairness” by not only selecting individuals likely 
to give a result favorable to the outcome of the study. Id. “Social justice requires that [a] distinction be 
drawn between classes of subjects that ought, and ought not, to participate in any particular kind of 
research, based on the ability of members of that class to bear burdens, and on the appropriateness of 
placing further burdens on already burdened persons.” Id. The Belmont Report makes no reference to 
international populations in developing nations when discussing social justice, but instead lists as 
examples “racial minorities, the economically disadvantaged, the very sick and the institutionalized.” 
Id.  
 37. See supra notes 1–9 (discussing articles in this series). See also Joe Stephens, Panel Suggests 
Rules for Foreign Drug Tests, WASH. POST, May, 1, 2001 at A21 (“The report also follows an 11-
month Washington Post investigation into ethical issues surrounding medical research conducted in 
the developing world.”). 
 38. The NBAC was established in 1944 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300v to, inter alia,  
undertake studies of the ethical and legal implications of the requirements for informed 
consent to participation in research projects and to otherwise undergo medical procedures . . . 
[and] current procedures and mechanisms designed to safeguard the privacy of human 
subjects of behavioral and biomedical research . . . and such other matters relating to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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entitled Ethical and Policy Issues in International Research: Clinical 
Trials in Developing Countries (hereinafter NBAC Report).39 The NBAC 
Report made twenty-two recommendations regarding “essential ethical 
requirements for the ethical conduct of clinical trails.”40  
The NBAC recommended that the United States refrain from 
sponsoring research that does not comply with certain minimal ethical 
standards and suggested that the FDA should not accept data obtained 
through unethical research.41 The NBAC further recommended that 
clinical trials in developing countries: (1) respond to the health needs of 
the population;42 (2) be designed to provide an established, effective 
treatment as a control group;43 and (3) be designed and implemented with 
input from local community members.44 Furthermore, informed consent 
must be obtained45 in a “culturally appropriate way.”46  
 
 
medicine or biomedical or behavioral research as the President may designate for study by the 
Commission.  
Id. 
 39. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION (NBAC), ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2001) [hereinafter NBAC 
ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES]. The report was commissioned in response to (1) public concerns 
regarding “the protection of the rights and welfare of human participants” in international research 
“conducted or sponsored by U.S. interests” and (2) “the changing landscape of international research” 
as a result of the increasing status and sophistication of scientists from developing countries who are 
better able to collaborate with U.S. researchers. Id. at 3. The NBAC recommendations may be divided 
into substantive and procedural recommendations. Id. at 5. This Note is primarily concerned with the 
substantive recommendations of the report. Procedural recommendations beyond the scope of this 
Note are not discussed. The British corollary of the NBAC published the Nuffield Report in response 
to similar concerns. See Alice Page, Ethical Issues in International Biomedical Research: An 
Overview, 37 J. HEALTH L. 629, 630 (2004). 
 40. NBAC ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 39, at ii. In doing so, the NBAC extends the 
principles of the Belmont Report to human subjects research involving populations in developing 
nations. Id.  
 41. Id. at 6. Among these are:  
a) prior review of research by an ethics review committee(s); b) minimization of risk to 
participants; c) risks of harm that are reasonable in relation to potential benefits; d) adequate 
care of and compensation to participants for injuries directly sustained during research; e) 
individual consent from all competent adult participants in research; f) equal regard for all 
participants; and g) equitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of research.  
Id.  
 42. Id. at 8. This includes making post clinical trial access to the study treatment available to the 
population. Id. at 12. 
 43. Id. at 28. 
 44. Id. at 30–31. 
 45. Id. at 38. 
 46. Id. at 40. Procedurally, an ethics review committee should review the informed consent 
protocols as part of the clinical trial approval process. Id. To ensure culturally appropriate consent 
mechanisms, “[r]esearchers should consult with community representatives.” Id. Culturally 
appropriate informed consent may include consent from community leaders or representatives, which 
should be obtained without coercion to potential subjects. Id. at 43–44. Furthermore, in some cultures, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/22
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Additionally, the NBAC recommended that “[r]esearchers and 
sponsors of clinical trials should make good faith efforts . . . to secure, at 
the trial’s conclusion, continued access for all participants to needed 
experimental interventions that have been proven effective . . . .”47 The 
NBAC also recommended that researchers make effective treatments 
available to the general population of a host country, whenever pre-
negotiating with the host country is possible.48 The NBAC recommended 
procedures to ensure the protection of the host country’s citizens by 
generally stating that the U.S. government should only sponsor trials that 
both a U.S. IRB49 and a host country ethics review committee have 
approved.50 
 
 
informed consent may entail supplemental consent given by the subject’s husband. Id. at 45. If 
culturally appropriate, ethics review committees may waive the requirement that informed consent be 
given in writing if the study design indicates how such consent will be given. Id. at 50. The NBAC 
encourages the National Institute of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other 
relevant agencies to engage in research to determine culturally appropriate informed consent 
mechanisms for different cultures. Id.  
 47. Id. at 74. The initial research protocol should detail the “duration, extent and financing of 
such continued access.” Id.  
 48. Id. The NBAC recognizes but discounts criticism of pre-negotiated agreements to provide 
effective treatments in host countries. Id. at 67–68. These critiques include: (1) that reaching such an 
agreement might prevent or delay the research; (2) that such agreements may be “substantively, 
procedurally, and logistically” problematic; (3) that making such prior agreements is not standard in 
international research; (4) that the researchers may be unable to influence the host countries’ existing 
health policy to make provision of the treatment realistic; (5) that such agreements create a double 
standard for provision of treatments to host countries when such a requirement is not necessary in the 
United States; and (6) that such obligations may be breached. For detailed discussion and response to 
these critiques, see NBAC ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 39, at 67–72. 
 49. IRBs are established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 289 (2000), which provides that  
each entity which applies for a grant, contract, or cooperative agreement under this chapter 
for any project or program which involves the conduct of biomedical or behavioral research 
involving human subjects submit in or with its application for such grant, contract, or 
cooperative agreement assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that it has established (in 
accordance with regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe) a board (to be known as an 
“Institutional Review Board”) to review biomedical and behavioral research involving human 
subjects conducted at or supported by such entity in order to protect the rights of the human 
subjects of such research. 
 50. NBAC ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 39, at 83, 84. The NBAC recommends that 
the IRB requirement be waived when it has been determined that the host country ethics review board 
complies with the substantive ethical provisions discussed in note 32, supra. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. Pfizer’s Nigerian Antibiotic Research 
In 1996, a severe outbreak of bacterial meningitis occurred in northern 
Nigeria,51 a country already devastated by the ongoing effects of cholera 
and measles. 52 Meanwhile, in the United States, Pfizer had developed a 
new antibiotic known as Trovan53 and was starting clinical trials.54 Since 
animal studies indicated that Trovan caused complications in children, 
including bone and joint deformities and liver damage, Pfizer could not 
test Trovan on children in the United States.55 Scott Hopkins, a physician 
working for Pfizer, learned of Kano’s meningitis outbreak.56 Seeing this 
outbreak as an opportunity for extensive pediatric testing, Hopkins 
proposed to send a six member team to Kano57 in order to test orally-
administered Trovan on Nigerian children.58 In order to export Trovan to 
Nigeria, Pfizer obtained FDA approval, which was based upon the Kano 
government’s and a Nigerian hospital’s ethics committee’s approval.59 
The Pfizer team arrived in Nigeria and set up operations at Kano’s 
Infectious Disease Hospital (IDH).60 Over a two week period, Pfizer 
 
 
 51. Stephens, supra note 8, at A1. By the end of the epidemic 15,800 Africans died from 
meningitis. Id. See also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 2002 WL 31082956, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Abdullahi I).  
 52. Stephens, supra note 8, at A1.  
 53. Trovan is the brand name for the compound Trovaflozacin Mesylate. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 
31082956, at *1. 
 54. Stephens, supra note 8, at A1.  
 55. Id. Trovan belongs to a class of antibiotics known as quinolones which have been known to 
cause joint damage, including arthropathy and chondrodysplasia, in juvenile canines and rats. Trovan, 
in PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE 2645, 2650 (58th ed. 2004). Animal studies with Trovan yielded 
similar results. Id.  
 56. Stephens, supra note 8, at A1. 
 57. Nigeria has neither a formal review process for human subjects research nor widespread 
guidelines for ethical human subjects research other than those provided by the Declaration of 
Helsinki. Remigius Nwabueze, Ethical Review of Research Involving Human Subjects in Nigeria: 
Legal and Policy Issues, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 110 (2003). 
 58. Id. Hopkins pitched the Kano clinical trial to Pfizer as a humanitarian effort; however, 
another Pfizer representative called this characterization “a little bit disingenuous.” Id. Trovan had an 
estimated sales value of $1 billion per year and conducting clinical trials in developing nations was 
relatively inexpensive compared to conducting trials in developed, highly regulated nations. Id.  
 59. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *1. It was later alleged that the ethics committee 
approval letter did not exist at the time of the FDA’s approval but was later written, and backdated, in 
response to an FDA audit. Id. In fact, Sadiq Wali, medical director of the Kano hospital, later reported 
that no such IDH committee existed at the time of the Trovan trial and alleged that the letter must have 
been forged. Joe Stephens, Doctors Say Drug Trial’s Approval Was Backdated, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 
2001 at A1.  
 60. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *1; see also Stephens, supra note 8, at A1. Pfizer’s 
medical team was one of several others at IDH, including Doctors Without Borders. Id. All other 
medical teams provided established treatment regimens. Id.  
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treated 198 pediatric meningitis patients with either a full dose of oral 
Trovan or a partial dose of injected ceftriaxone.61 Pfizer never informed 
the subjects that they were part of a clinical trial or that free, established, 
effective treatment was being provided by other medical groups at the 
same facility.62 Although Pfizer’s protocol called for blood tests upon 
admission and at fixed treatment intervals, Pfizer did not perform the 
necessary blood tests on all of the patients.63 Furthermore, it was alleged 
that Pfizer did not change treatment protocols for patients who failed to 
respond to the experimental treatment with Trovan.64  
After only two weeks, Pfizer left Nigeria and directed the research 
subjects to follow up with the other clinicians at the IDH.65 At the end of 
the Kano-Trovan clinical trial, it was alleged that eleven children died, 
five in the Trovan group and six in the control ceftriaxone group.66 
Approximately sixty children reported arthralgias and other disease 
sequelae after receiving Trovan.67  
Following the Kano clinical trials, Pfizer applied to the FDA for 
approval of pediatric use of Trovan in the United States.68 When the FDA 
noted discrepancies during an audit of the Nigeria documents,69 Pfizer 
withdrew its application to use the drug for “epidemic meningitis.”70 In 
February of 1998, Pfizer began marketing Trovan in the United States,71 
 
 
 61. Id. Pfizer alleges that the under dosing of the ceftriaxone control group resulted from an 
attempt to reduce the pain of the injections that were given mainly intramuscularly by inexperienced 
hospital staff. Id. Hoffman-Laroche, the maker of ceftriaxone, alleges that such low dosing may have 
skewed the study results in favor of Trovan and could have resulted in unnecessary deaths for some 
children. Id.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. Pfizer again alleged that the tests were not completed due to staff shortages and staff 
inexperience. Id. 
 64. See id. (reporting that at least two patients died while taking the oral Trovan, including a ten 
year old girl who worsened over three days without being switched to the ceftriaxone control group). 
 65. Id. Children who still needed treatment were transferred to another hospital. Id. 
 66. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *2. Doctors Without Borders estimated the mortality rate 
in Kano to be about 20% overall. Stephens, supra note 8, at A1. 
 67. Id. Joint symptoms may also be a complication of bacterial meningitis. Gerard Merenstein, 
David Kaplan & Adam Rosenberg, HANDBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 334–39 (18th ed. 1997). The Nigerian 
families also allege other side effects of treatment including brain damage, paralysis, and seizures. See 
Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Appellees at 9, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, F. 
App’x 48 (2003) (Nos. 02-9223).  
 68. Stephens, supra note 8, at A1. 
 69. Id. Discrepancies included disparate recording of white blood cell counts, contradictory 
statements about where lab work had been performed, and an inability to determine who had actually 
recorded data. Id. 
 70. Id. In fact, Trovan was never approved for use in children in the United States. Furthermore, 
when the European Union approved Trovan, it specifically stated that the antibiotic should not be 
given to children. Id. 
 71. Id. Trovan’s approval for use in adults was based on clinical trials in 13,000 people in 27 
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but shortly thereafter, complaints of liver disease and liver failure surfaced 
among Trovan users; these complaints lead to severe restrictions of 
Trovan’s use in the United States.72 
B. Trovan Clinical Trial Litigation 
1.  Abdullahi v. Pfizer in District Court 
On July 31, 2001, thirty Nigerian families whose children were 
involved in the Kano–Trovan clinical trials filed a lawsuit in federal 
district court for the Southern District of New York alleging that Pfizer 
exposed them to “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.”73 As the basis 
of their action, plaintiffs claimed that Pfizer failed to obtain informed 
consent, that Pfizer did not inform them that they would be part of a 
clinical trial, that they had the right to refuse experimental treatment, and 
that other medical teams within the same facility could have provided safe, 
effective treatment at no cost.74  
Plaintiffs sought relief under the Alien Tort Statute75 (ATS) which 
provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”76 The plaintiffs pointed to 
violations of ICCPR Article 7,77 the Nuremberg Code,78 the Declaration of 
Helsinki,79 and “other norms of international law” in order to establish 
 
 
different countries. Id. 
 72. Id. Trovan’s use in the European Union has been completely suspended. Id. See also 
Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *2.  
 73. Joe Stephens, Suit Accuses Pfizer of Rights Violations, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2001, at A9 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 74. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *2. Doctors Without Borders offered treatment with 
choloramphenicol at the same facility. Id. 
 75. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988) [hereinafter ATS]. Although the ATS usually applies to state actors, 
it may be applicable to private actors if their conduct is particularly egregious. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 
70 F.3d 232, 239–40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Individuals may be held liable for offenses against international 
law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide.”) (citing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Laws of the U.S. (1986)). Here, plaintiffs do not allege such conduct but rather allege that “Pfizer 
acted as a de facto state actor because it conducted the Trovan study with the assistance of the 
Nigerian government and government employees from IDH and Aminu Teaching Hospital.” Abdullahi 
I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *5. Analyzing the relationship under a joint participation theory, the district 
court found that Pfizer was in fact a joint participant with the Nigerian government. Id. at *5–6. 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. To bring a cause of action under the ATS, plaintiffs must adequately plead 
a breach of international law. See Kadic, 70 F.3d, at 238.  
 77. CIOMS ETHICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 18. 
 78. The Nuremberg Code, supra note 13. 
 79. WMA, THE DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 17. 
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federal court jurisdiction under the ATS.80 Although the district court 
conceded that the plaintiffs may have had a colorable claim under the 
ATS,81 it dismissed the action on the basis of forum non conveniens 
concluding that Nigeria would be a more appropriate forum for the 
litigation.82 
2. Zango v. Pfizer 
One of the district court’s primary reasons for dismissing the Abdullahi 
action was that Pfizer was already facing a lawsuit in Nigeria based on the 
Kano clinical trials.83 In the Nigerian case styled Zango v. Pfizer Int’l, 
Inc.,84 the plaintiffs sued both Pfizer and Nigerian government officials in 
order to obtain an emergency injunction to limit Pfizer’s Trovan clinical 
trials.85 The injunction was denied.86 The plaintiffs then sought damages 
from Pfizer and the government officials.87 When the defendant 
government officials failed to appear in court and made procedural errors 
in their filings, the plaintiffs dropped their suit against them but continued 
to pursue the action against Pfizer.88  
Upon dismissal of the suit against the government, the three hundred-
fifty Zango plaintiffs proceeded with their action against Pfizer, but they 
eventually dismissed that lawsuit as well.89 The plaintiffs averred that they 
dismissed the suit because of undue delays in the litigation, citing removal 
of the judge initially assigned to the case, fourteen adjournments, a second 
judge stepping down from the case for personal reasons, and no 
 
 
 80. Abdullahi I, 2002 WL 31082956, at *4.  
 81. “Non-self executing agreements like ICCPR may evidence the binding principles of 
international law . . . . Thus, while plaintiff’s need not rely on ICCPR to provide a private right of 
action, they may look to that treaty to allege that Pfizer’s conduct violated well established, universally 
recognized norms of international law.” Id. (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). 
 82. Id. at *12. The district court found forum non conveniens based on the following 
considerations: (1) Nigeria provided an adequate alternative forum; (2) Pfizer was already defending a 
lawsuit in Nigeria based on the same conduct; (3) the presumption that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is 
convenient is weaker when the plaintiff is foreign; (4) Nigerian courts should be able to apply 
international law as effectively as U.S. courts; (5) Nigeria has a strong interest in the litigation; and (6) 
most of the documents and witnesses necessary for trial are located in Nigeria. Id. at *6–12. 
 83. Id. at *12. 
 84. Case No. FHC/K/CS/204/2001(Nigeria). 
 85. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Appellees at 11, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 77 F. App’x 
48 (2003) (Nos. 02-9223, 02-9303). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 12. 
 88. Id. at 11. 
 89. Id. at 13. Note that the fact that there were three hundred-fifty Zango plaintiffs in addition to 
the Abdullahi and Adamu plaintiffs, infra note 115, contradicts accounts that there were two hundred 
children treated, supra note 54. 
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replacement judge being assigned to the case.90 The Abdullahi plaintiffs 
allege that the second judge in the Zango proceedings recused himself 
because of undue pressure from Pfizer.91 The Zango proceedings were 
dismissed on October 17, 2002, approximately one month after the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the 
Abdullahi proceedings for forum non conveniens.92 
3. Abdullahi v. Pfizer in the Appellate Court 
In the United States, the Abdullahi plaintiffs appealed the district 
court’s forum non conveniens dismissal of their case to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.93 Noting that the Nigerian Zango 
proceedings had been dismissed, the Second Circuit vacated the district 
court’s judgment and remanded the case for rehearing on the forum non 
conveniens issue.94 In remanding the case, the appellate court instructed 
the district court to reconsider the adequacy of the Nigerian courts as a 
forum for the Abdullahi action in light of the Zango dismissal.95  
4. Abdullahi Rehearing in the District Court 
On remand, the district court primarily addressed the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss. The court determined that none of the sources of law 
 
 
 90. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 2005 WL 1870811, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Abdullahi III). There is 
conflict in the record regarding whether the Zango plaintiffs may have contributed to the delay 
themselves by requesting continuances and pointing out technical deficiencies in the defendant’s 
filings. Id.  
 91. Id. at *6. Plaintiffs also allege that Pfizer bribed other law enforcement officials in Nigeria 
during the clinical trials. They allege that the Nigerian government halted the trials and that Pfizer 
employees in Nigeria requested cash from Pfizer headquarters to prevent them from being jailed. Id. at 
*5. In a letter written by Abdullahi plaintiffs’ counsel Elaine Kusel, plaintiffs allege that “[t]hese facts 
provide strong circumstantial evidence that Justice Hobon declined jurisdiction because he was subject 
to improper or undue pressure, perhaps from Pfizer itself, or from government officials friendly to 
Pfizer who had been involved with the Trovan tests.” Id. at *6 (internal quotations omitted). 
 92. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 77 F. App’x 48, 52 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) (Abdullahi II). The Abdullahi 
plaintiffs allege that the Zango case was dismissed approximately one month prior to the district 
court’s Abdullahi decision. Id. They rely on the fact that the “Notice of Discontinuance” was dated 
August 19, 2002; however, the Second Circuit opinion notes that the Notice was not actually filed with 
the Nigerian court until October 17, 2002. Id. 
 93. Id. at 50. Pfizer cross appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss; however, the appellate 
court did not reach this issue. Id. at 53.  
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 53. The appellate court declined to decide the forum non conveniens issue, citing 
factual conflicts in the record as to what occurred in the Zango proceedings that needed to be resolved 
by a fact finder. Id. 
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the plaintiffs cited in their original action gave rise to a cause of action 
under the ATS against Pfizer.96 
The court first addressed the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant’s 
conduct violated the Nuremberg Code. The district court held that 
violations of the Nuremberg Code did not give rise to a cause of action 
under the ATS stating that: (1) the Code did not “give rise to a private 
right of action;” (2) the United States had not ratified or adopted the Code; 
and (3) the Code had not been adopted by the international community, 
including the United Nations and other prominent states.97 
The court next addressed the plaintiffs’ second claim of jurisdiction 
based on the Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS Guidelines.98 The 
court found that these guidelines were general policy statements issued by 
private organizations but not law.99 Furthermore, the court determined that 
both the Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS Guidelines, as general 
policy statements, did not dictate specific behavior.100 In addition, the 
court found that neither the Declaration of Helsinki nor the CIOMS 
Guidelines created binding legal obligations.101 Consequently, the 
plaintiffs could not assert a cause of action under the ATS based on either 
policy.102  
Third, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ claim of jurisdiction under the 
ATS based on Pfizer’s alleged violation of ICCPR Article 7103 for failure 
to obtain informed consent. While the court conceded that the ICCPR does 
create customary international law, it refused to recognize the ICCPR 
 
 
 96. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *11. 
 97. Id. at *10. 
 98. See generally CIOMS ETHICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 18. CIOMS published these 
guidelines in collaboration with the World Health Organization. The guidelines cover ethical review, 
informed consent, vulnerable groups, and women as research participants. These guidelines 
incorporate many of the general principles contained in the guidelines discussed above. 
 99. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *12. The court relies on Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 
414 F.3d 233, 262 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that a “mere general statement of policy . . . is unlikely to 
give rise to obligations in any strict sense”), and United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 102–03 (2d Cir. 
2003): 
In a system governed by the rule of law, no private person-or group of men and women such 
as compromise the body of international scholars-creates the law. Accordingly, instead of 
relying primarily on the works of scholars for a statement of the customary international law, 
we look primarily to the formal lawmaking and official actions of States and only secondarily 
to the works of scholars as evidence of the established practice of States. 
 100. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *12. See Flores, 414 F.3d at *254 (“[I]n order to state a 
claim under the [ATS], we have required that a plaintiff allege a violation of a clear and unambiguous 
rule of customary international law.”). 
 101. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *12. 
 102. Id. 
 103. ICCPR, supra note 21. 
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articles as binding obligations on federal courts.104 In reaching its 
conclusion, the court relied on the fact that the United States ratified the 
ICCPR as a non self-executing treaty.105 
Finally, the court turned to the plaintiffs’ claim that jurisdiction under 
ATS was proper based on the defendant’s alleged violations of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration of Human Rights).106 
The court held that the Declaration of Human Rights is not binding but is 
merely “aspirational” by asserting that, “this Court will not judicially forge 
broad aspirational language into customary international law.”107 The 
court found no private right of action under any of the sources of 
international law plaintiffs cited and thus declined to assert jurisdiction 
under the ATS.108 Based on these findings, the district court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.109 
The court next addressed the forum non conveniens issue. The court 
affirmed its previous ruling that Nigeria provided an adequate alternative 
forum for the plaintiffs’ claim.110 Based on its assessment of the Zango 
record,111 the court determined that there was insufficient evidence to 
indicate that the Nigerian courts were not an adequate forum.112 The court 
stated that the temporary delay in the Zango proceedings was not enough 
to render the forum inadequate, noting that it was the Zango plaintiffs who 
had voluntarily dismissed the suit.113 Although the court ultimately 
dismissed the action based on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, it 
 
 
 104. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *13. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 
(2004) (“[A]lthough the [ICCPR] does bind the United States as a matter of international law, the 
United States ratified the covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so 
did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts.”). 
 105. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *13. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (“[T]he Senate has 
expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and applying international human 
rights law, as when its ratification of the [ICCPR] declared that the substantive provision of the 
document were not self-executing.”). 
 106. WMA, THE DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 17. 
 107. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *13.  
 108. Id. at *14. 
 109. Id. at *18. 
 110. See id. 
 111. The court notes that it was unable to obtain a transcript of the Zango proceedings and 
therefore bases its conclusions on affidavits of the party’s experts. Id. at *3. 
 112. See id. at *16. “Most of Plaintiffs’ submissions are ‘of little use’ because ‘they largely 
consist[] of broad, conclusory assertions as to the relative corruptability or incorruptability of the 
[Nigerian] courts, with scant reference to specifics.’” Id. (quoting Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. 
Supp. 2d 534, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
 113. Id. at *17. “An alternative forum will be held inadequate only in those rare circumstances 
where it is so clearly unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.” Id. at *18 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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specifically stated “[e]ven if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction, it 
would dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds . . . .”114 
5. Adamu v. Pfizer 
A second group of plaintiffs brought suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York based on Pfizer’s Trovan trials in 
Kano.115 In addition to the claims alleged in Abdullahi, the plaintiffs 
claimed breach of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) 
and the Connecticut Products Liability Act (CPLA).116 The district court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS for substantially the same 
reasons enumerated in Abdullahi117 and dismissed the claims under the 
Connecticut statutes after determining that Nigerian, rather than 
Connecticut law, governed the action.118 In reaching its holding, the court 
applied principles of conflict of laws and reasoned that Nigeria had the 
greater interest in seeing its laws applied.119 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The final section of this Note analyzes the likelihood of any remedy for 
plaintiffs in cases similar to Abdullahi under the ATS as it is currently 
interpreted by U.S. federal courts. It then discusses the inadequacy of 
 
 
 114. Id. at *18. The court conditioned its dismissal on the defendant’s (1) “consent[] to suit and 
acceptance of process in any suit plaintiffs file in Nigeria . . .”; (2) waiver of any applicable statute of 
limitations in Nigeria; (3) payments for transportation of any documents or witnesses necessary for the 
action in Nigeria; and (4) waiver of any claim of res judicata or collateral estoppel in the U.S. District 
Court should Nigeria decline to accept jurisdiction of the case. Id. Also, note the inherent 
inconsistency between the district court’s rehearing opinion and its initial decision. See supra text 
accompanying note 81.  
 115. See Adamu v. Pfizer, 399 F. Supp. 2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). This case was originally filed in 
the District of Connecticut, but was transferred to the Southern District of New York. Id. at 497. 
 116. Id. at 497. 
 117. Id. at 503. These reasons are enumerated in notes 90–100, supra. 
 118. Id. at 503. 
 119. Id. See also Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (“The rights and liabilities of 
parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect 
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles 
stated in § 6.”); Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 6: 
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions will follow a statutory directive of its own 
state on choice of law. (2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice 
of applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of interstate and international systems, (b) the 
relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states in the 
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic 
polices underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of 
result, and (g) ease in determination and application of the law to be applied. 
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available remedies in light of U.S. tort policy and how the lack of proper 
remedies may reinforce cultural norms. Next, the Note examines how the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens further deters foreign plaintiffs’ efforts 
and the inadequacy of international enforcement mechanisms in 
addressing their claims. Finally, the Note recommends solutions to 
reasonably regulating U.S. companies’ pharmaceutical testing in 
developing nations. 
A.  The Alien Tort Statute Decisions 
The Abdullahi and Adamu cases may have a profound impact on the 
ATS being available as a remedy for damages U.S. companies cause in 
international human subjects research. These decisions severely limit the 
scope of what can be considered “international law,” especially in regard 
to ethical human subjects research behavior. However, the ATS should not 
be considered only in this context.  
The Second Circuit has held that customary international law 
encompasses “those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, 
out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.”120 In Flores v. S. 
Peru Copper Core, the Second Circuit explicitly excluded the ICCPR, on 
which the Abdullahi plaintiffs relied, from being customary international 
law sufficient to bring a claim under the ATS.121 Furthermore, the Flores 
Court held that even “shocking and egregious” conduct does not 
necessarily give rise to a violation of customary international law under 
the ATS.122 
Principles established by the U.S. Supreme Court for defining 
international law under the ATS have been set forth in other contexts. In 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,123 the Court held that a violation of the law of 
 
 
 120. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
However, the Second Circuit severely limits the applicability of this definition by stating: “[I]n 
determining what offenses violate customary international law, courts must proceed with extraordinary 
care and restraint.” Id. 
 In Flores, representatives of deceased Peruvian miners brought suit against an American mining 
company alleging violation of plaintiffs’ rights to health and a clean environment. Id. at 143–44. The 
Flores Court defined customary international law as “those rules that States universally abide by, or 
accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.” Id. at 154. The Court furthermore 
held that “[i]n determining whether a particular rule is part of customary international law . . . courts 
must look to concrete evidence of the customs and practices of States.” Id. at 156. 
 121. Id. at 163–64. The Second Circuit’s rationale was twofold: (1) the ICCPR is not a self-
executing treaty and (2) none of its provisions are specifically definite enough to define a standard 
under international law. Id. 
 122. Id. at 159. 
 123. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). In Sosa, the plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, alleged that he was abducted 
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nations must “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the features of 
the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”124 In addition, courts 
must be “particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the 
Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”125  
Furthermore, the Court declared that the Declaration of Human Rights 
“[d]oes not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international 
law.”126 The Court has likewise rejected attempts to use the ICCPR as a 
basis for establishing customary international law. The Court stated that 
although the ICCPR “[d]oes bind the United States as a matter of 
international law, the United States ratified the [ICCPR] on the express 
understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create 
obligations enforceable in the federal courts.”127  
What has become clear post-Sosa is that it will be difficult for plaintiffs 
like those in Abdullahi to prevail under the ATS128 because Sosa expressly 
limits the ATS to providing subject-matter jurisdiction and explicitly states 
that the ATS itself does not provide a separate cause of action.129  
Plaintiffs who seek to assert a cause of action must find a source of 
international law, custom, or norm. The Abdullahi and Adamu plaintiffs 
asserted claims based on international treaties, policies, and customs 
regarding human rights as applied to medical care and treatment.130 No 
source was sufficient to bring a claim under the ATS.131 These plaintiffs 
 
 
by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to stand trial in the U.S. Id. at 695. He brought suit 
against another Mexican citizen whom he alleged had aided the DEA in his abduction under the ATS. 
Id. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiff’s claim under the ATS, holding that the statute gave both subject-
matter jurisdiction and a cause of action. Id. at 699. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed its holding that 
the ATS provided only jurisdiction. Id. at 723. Significantly, Sosa was decided after Abdullahi I and II, 
but before Abdullahi III and Adamu. 
 124. Id. at 725.  
 125. Id. at 727. 
 126. Id. at 735.  
 127. Id. See also id. at 728 (noting that “the Senate expressly declined to give the federal courts 
the task of interpreting and applying international human rights law, as when its ratification of the 
[ICCPR] declared that the substantive provisions of the document were not self-executing”). 
 128. See Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators 
Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary 
Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 212 (2005) (“Abdullahi may signify a new trend in ATS 
cases in which courts will entertain product liability-like causes of actions. It remains to be seen 
whether such cases will survive after Sosa.”). 
 129. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 97–107. 
 131. ATS claims have survived for allegations of slavery; forced labor; genocide; crimes against 
humanity; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; forced exile; arbitrary detention; freedom of 
association; and right to life. See Coliver et al., supra note 128, at 216. The authors postulate that pre-
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essentially had no cause of action in U.S. courts for the alleged wrongs 
committed by a U.S. pharmaceutical corporation.  
B.  U.S. Tort Policy 
The basic functions of the U.S. tort system are: (1) corrective justice; 
(2) optimal deterrence; (3) loss distribution; and (4) redress of social 
grievances.132 Disallowance of claims, like those of the Nigerian plaintiffs, 
under the ATS undermines these functions. It provides no justice for those 
who have been wronged. Lack of redress for these groups of victims fails 
to deter corporate entities from engaging in unethical research in under-
developed countries when that research is economically beneficial to 
them.133 Furthermore, when loss occurs as a result of unethical research, it 
distributes the loss to those least able to bear it, while potential intentional 
tortfeasors may benefit from such a loss. Researchers should not be 
allowed to “[e]xploit and take advantage of the abundant research subjects, 
poverty and disease, low level of regulation, and comparatively cheaper 
cost of clinical trials in developing countries . . .”134 without bearing some 
of the resultant loss. The victim of unethical research will not receive any 
compensation for his or her loss. And finally, this result fails to redress 
social grievances caused by large, impersonal corporations.135 
C.  Cultural Norms 
Failing to compensate victims of harmful, unethical medical research 
reinforces the notion that the persons affected are inferior and thus, not 
deserving of redress.136 Attorney Jay Dyckman argues that “postcolonial 
 
 
Sosa causes of action will remain viable while post-Sosa causes will bear a heavier burden of 
production. Id. at 217. The authors further speculate that causes involving physical violence will be the 
most successful. Id. 
 132. KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14–20 (2d ed. 2002). 
 133. See Colloquy, International Challenges for the Pharmaceutical/Biotech Industries in the 21st 
Century, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2004) (commenting on, inter alia, pharmaceutical 
research in developing countries, Mr. Mauer, lecturer in public policy at the University of California, 
Berkeley, states: “The reason that these standards are so high is because the assumption is the 
pharmaceutical researchers are cheating. Because you have huge economic advantages to cheat on 
your studies to make them look good . . . . And I think litigation does drive some honesty. It can 
obviously go to the extreme, but it does drive one to, if one is doing bad things, at least, to cover it up 
better.”). 
 134. Remigius Nwabueze, Ethical Review of Research Involving Human Subjects in Nigeria: 
Legal and Policy Issues, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 88 (2003). 
 135. See ABRAHAM, supra note 132, at 19. 
 136. See generally Jay Dyckman, The Myth of Informed Consent: An Analysis of the Doctrine of 
Informed Consent and Its (Mis)application in HIV Experiments On Pregnant Women in Developing 
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media images [portraying Africans] as diseased, dismembered, deformed, 
and deceased” cause them to be viewed as merely fungible bodies, subject 
to the rules of property.137 Imposing liability on researchers who take such 
a callous perspective of human life, as evidenced by unethical medical 
research procedures, forces the researchers to take the research subject’s 
humanity into consideration when designing and implementing a study.  
D.  The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
Additionally, the Abdullahi court’s forum non conveniens analysis fails 
to consider the practical difficulties that the Abdullahi plaintiffs faced by 
bringing suit in Nigeria.138 Although Nigeria, as a member of the World 
Medical Association, is subject to the Declaration of Helsinki, currently it 
has no formal ethics regulatory process.139 The Nigerian “Constitution has 
made provisions to insulate the judiciary from legislative and executive 
political influences and to ensure impartial determination of cases . . . 
[however,] implementation must be left to human imperfections and 
vagaries.”140 Although the Nigerian Constitution seeks to prevent 
influence through fixed salary and term of service provisions, politically 
unpopular judges can and have been removed from office.141 Furthermore, 
fixed salaries can be adjusted for inflation, at times giving rise to 
implications of corruption.142 Additionally, the judicial appointment 
process may be used to apply political pressure to the Nigerian 
judiciary.143 The combination of political influences on the judiciary and 
lack of ethical regulatory control over medical experimentation may 
thwart the effective prosecution of human subject research ethics violators 
 
 
Countries, 9 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 91, 120 (1999) (hypothesizing that apathy regarding medical 
experimentation in African nations stems from images of dismembered African war and famine 
victims, which leads to the notion that “these bodies are irrelevant”). 
 137. Id. According to Dyckman, such thinking (“that certain groups are not worthy of medicine or 
bodily integrity because of the social or political construction of their bodies as inferior”) gave rise to 
the Holocaust. Id. at 119. 
 138. See generally Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSN’L L. 153, 168 (2003) (“[T]he United States should support effective analysis by 
U.S. courts in scrutinizing practices of foreign judiciaries to determine their independence and in 
examining whether local justice can be fairly and effectively administered.”). 
 139. See Nwabueze, supra note 134, at 102–03. 
 140. Major Nannguhan Madza, The Judicial System of Nigeria, ARMY LAW. 20, 26 (1987).  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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in developing countries worldwide.144 The Zango case illustrates this 
result.  
E.  International Efforts 
The International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) was established 
to create international ethical guidelines for biomedical research.145 The 
guidelines promulgated by ICH are, like many other ethical guidelines, 
voluntary.146 Although published in the Federal Register, they lack the 
force of law in the United States and abroad.147 Therefore, the ICH 
guidelines are insufficient to protect human research subjects in 
developing nations. 
International cooperation, however, may lead to developed countries 
dominating policy origination.148 Such a scenario would be costly to 
developed nations in terms of development and enforcement dollars and 
could lead nations who are not part of the policy process to resent the 
development process.149 Principles of cultural relativism150 dictate that all 
cultures involved must be accounted for in any broad policy decisions in 
order for such policies to be truly ethical. 
Additionally, enforcement of international policy necessitates the 
establishment of a suitable forum. Either a United Nations enforcement 
council or an independent “permanent Nuremberg” tribunal could be 
established, and such a council would have to recognize corporations as 
entities in order to prosecute them.151  
 
 
 144. See OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT, supra note 29. See also Meier, supra note 22, at 532 
(“African nations vie to minimize regulation on the conduct of medical research. They fear that 
legislation, and resulting lawsuits, could have a chilling effect on beneficial research efforts.”). 
 145. OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT, supra note 29, at 3. Countries party to this conference include 
the United States, Japan, and the European Union. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. William Dubois, New Drug Research, the Exterritorial Application of FDA Regulations and 
the Need for International Cooperation, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161, 205 (2003) (proposing 
“unilateral extraterritorial action by the United States or European Union”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Cultural Relativisim is “[a]ntorpological perspective that withholds condemnation of 
‘cultural practices’ of communities not ones’s own.” Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian 
Women and the “Cultural Defense”, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 83 (1994). 
 151. See Dubois, supra note 148, at 206–07. “Corporations are not currently treated as legal 
entities under international human rights law.” Id. at 203. 
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F.  Proposed Legislative Solution 
Given the difficulties with international cooperation, a voluntary 
plaintiffs’ forum in the United States, under the ATS, for example, would 
be the ideal enforcement mechanism for accepted international ethical 
guidelines. Because circuit courts and the Supreme Court have limited the 
scope of what constitutes international law under the ATS, it may be 
necessary for Congress to give legislative guidance regarding what was 
intended to be considered international law under the ATS. 152 Congress 
could choose to recognize ICCPR or the Nuremberg Code, two widely 
accepted standards in international law, to create a right of action under 
the ATS. By doing so, Congress could limit the effect of the ATS to 
situations where it felt judicial interference was necessary; therefore courts 
would not be faced with the issue of whether to interfere in foreign policy, 
a concern expressed in Sosa.153  
Indeed, the DHHS and FDA regulations on the protection of human 
subjects in research make it clear that, according to U.S. policy, human 
subjects research done abroad should comport with domestic regulations. 
The difficulty is that such regulations only reach federally–funded 
research and research on drugs and devices regulated by the FDA. 
Abdullahi and its companion cases illustrate that even when drugs and 
devices are monitored by the FDA, FDA and DHHS guidelines are 
sometimes disregarded without repercussions in the drug approval process. 
A legislative solution strengthens the established U.S. position on the 
protection of human subjects in privately–funded research done abroad. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite the overwhelming number of ethical guidelines for 
international medical research, especially as relating to developing 
countries, and a large body of scholarly literature on the subject,154 there is 
little in the way of enforcement mechanisms outside of the host country. 
As previously discussed, developing countries may lack the infrastructure 
and regulatory ability to oversee medical research studies. Furthermore, 
 
 
 152. See Virginia Monken Gomez, The Sosa Standard: What Does it Mean for Future ATS 
Litigation, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 469, 500 (2006) (“Unless Congress takes additional action, however, the 
scope of [the U.S. judiciary’s] role under the auspices of the ATS is a narrow one [post-Sosa].”). 
 153. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
 154. Indeed, not only are there many ethical guidelines on the subject, review of these guidelines 
reveals that the basic tenets of such guidelines are strikingly similar and not in dispute. See generally 
Page, supra note 39. 
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political pressures and the healthcare needs of the target population may 
influence governmental and judicial decision-making. 
Ethical guidelines promulgated by ICH and the NBAC, as well as the 
WHO-CIOMS Guidelines and the Declaration of Helsinki, are all 
voluntary. International treaties such as ICCPR are not binding on 
countries that are not party to them. Furthermore, U.S. federal courts seem 
reluctant to acknowledge these documents as sources of cognizable 
international law for purposes of bringing a claim under the ATS. The 
Zango, Adamu, and Abdullahi cases illustrate the enforcement difficulties 
with such voluntary and treaty ethical guidelines.  
While many corporations engaged in human subjects biomedical 
research will comply with such guidelines, there are huge financial 
incentives for not complying.155 Furthermore, cultural views and images 
which may arguably commoditize or disembody persons in developing 
countries reinforce notions that persons in developing nations are 
expendable. 
Enforcement mechanisms are necessary outside of the host country in 
order to ensure that research is conducted ethically. Multinational 
regulation and enforcement is problematic because of the difficulty, 
expense, and cultural implications of policy development and enforcement 
mechanisms. Moreover, under international human rights law, corporate 
entities might fall outside the ambit of such a scheme.  
Because of U.S. judicial reluctance to enforce the norms of ethical 
international biomedical human subject research, legislative intervention 
may be necessary to protect vulnerable populations. The legislature could 
remedy the impact of Sosa and similar circuit court decisions on claims 
brought under the ATS statute by clarifying what constitutes an acceptable 
form of international law under the ATS. In the context of international 
human subjects research, this could be accomplished either by 
acknowledging ICCPR as international law applicable to the United States 
or by acknowledging voluntary ethical guidelines as norms.156 A 
legislative remedy of the ATS ensures that U.S. biomedical research 
corporations will be responsible for their actions and thus fulfill the basic 
functions of the U.S. tort system. Furthermore, this would not lead to 
 
 
 155. See OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT, supra note 29, at 13–14. 
 156. In fact, U.S. courts have incorporated international law in domestic cases involving 
biomedical human subject research. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc. 782 A.2d 807, 835 
(Md. 2001) (applying the Nuremburg Code in a case of non-therapeutic experimentation absent 
informed consent stating that “the Nuremberg Code . . . was the result of legal thought and legal 
principles, as opposed to medical or scientific principles, and thus should be the preferred standard for 
assessing the legality of scientific research on human subjects”). 
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resentment by underdeveloped nations because their citizens would be 
able to choose whether or not to take advantage of this remedy. 157 In the 
age of globalization, “[b]arring the courthouse door is not a feasible 
strategy.”158 We cannot allow U.S. pharmaceutical corporations to do 
overseas with impunity what they would not be permitted to do within our 
own borders. 
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 157. Schrage, supra note 138, at 164 (“The Alien Tort Statute should be an effective tool to 
support development of the rule of law. The threat of civil liability in the United States encourages 
improvements in the administration of justice and meaningful relief for victims of abuse in developing 
countries, since such relief would reduce the likelihood that U.S. courts will accept jurisdiction in the 
first place.”). 
 158. Id. (arguing that the sustained growth of the U.S. economy stems in part from the global 
confidence in the U.S judiciary). 
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